“Incompleteness means that some of the necessary course work, for unforeseen but entirely justified reasons, has not been completed and evaluated during the prescribed period and that credits can still be obtained. It is the student`s responsibility to provide relevant information to the course leader and to reach agreement on how to meet the remaining course requirements. Important: If the student does not meet the “I” agreement terms within the allotted time, the course director should update the “I” with the “Grade Change” function in his WebPortal SDSU account to the corresponding final grade. The 2016 Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded to Oliver D. Hart and Bengt Holmstrom for their contribution to contract theory, including incomplete contracts.  Incomplete paradigmatics were developed by Sanford J. Grossman, Oliver D. Hart and John H. Moore.
In their pioneering contributions, Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990) and Hart (1995) argue that in practice, contracts are not able to indicate what to do in all possible eventualities.    At the time of awarding of the contract, future contingencies may not even be described. In addition, the parties cannot commit to never engaging in mutually beneficial renegotiations in their relations at a later date. One of the direct consequences of the incomplete approach to public procurement is therefore the so-called stop-stop problem.  As the parties subsequently renegotiate their contractual agreements, at least in some countries of the world, they do not have sufficient incentives to make relational investments (the investment returns of one party being partly referred to the other party in the renegotiations). Oliver Hart and his co-authors argue that the problem of heisting can be mitigated by the choice of an appropriate ex ante ownership structure (according to the incomplete paradigmatic of the contract, more complex contractual agreements are excluded). Therefore, the property rights approach of the company theory may explain the pros and cons of vertical integration and thus provide a formal answer to important questions about the company`s limitations, which were first raised by Ronald Coase (1937).  In economic theory, the field of contract theory can be divided into the theory of complete contracts and the theory of incomplete contracts. The incomplete approach to public procurement is still the subject of an ongoing debate in contract theory. In particular, some authors, such as Maskin and Tirole (1999), argue that rational parties should be able to solve the problem of maintaining by complex contracts, while Hart and Moore (1999) point out that these contractual solutions do not work if renegotiations cannot be excluded.
   Some authors have argued that the pros and cons of vertical integration can sometimes be explained in comprehensive contractual models.  Williamson (2000) criticized the lack of property rights based on incomplete contracts because it focuses on incentives for ex ante investment, while neglecting ex post inefficiencies.  Schmitz (2006) indicated that the approach to property rights could be extended to asymmetrical information, which could explain ex post inefficiencies.  The approach to property rights has also been expanded by Chiu (1998) and DeMeza and Lockwood (1998), which allow for the modelling of renegotiations.   In a new extension, Hart and Moore (2008) argued that contracts could serve as benchmarks.  The theory of incomplete contracts has been successfully applied in various contexts, including privatization international trade, Research and Development Management, Awarding formal and real authority, Defenders and many others.