… The solution to the Czechoslovakian problem that has just been found is, in my opinion, only the prelude to a larger colony in which all Europe can find peace. This morning I had another meeting with the German Chancellor, Mr. Hitler, and this is the document that bears his name, as well as mine. Some of you may have already heard what it contains, but I`d just like to read it to you: ` … We consider the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German naval agreement as a symbol of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war again.  Chamberlain had escaped the trap set for him by his political rivals. True to form, many interpreted the Munich Agreements on what it meant to their own perspectives. Some feared that Chamberlain would declare an early general election, in which he would go wild to win. A panicked Churchill explored building an alliance with Labour, Liberals and Conservative rebels, suggesting that a commitment to the League of Nations and “collective security” could form the basis of a joint campaign. When Macmillan protested, “This is not our jargon,” Churchill thought, “This is jargon that we all need to learn!” After Poland learned that populated territories in Poland were to be transferred to Germany, Poland issued a note to the Czechoslovak government regarding the immediate conclusion of an agreement providing for the unquestionable occupation of Polish territory by Polish troops; An agreement on referendums is expected to follow in districts with a large proportion of the Polish population.  Halifax argued that Great Britain and France should fight with them if the Czechs decided against Germany. His attitude was probably more rooted in politics – the fear of how the government was perceived at home – than strategic disagreements with Chamberlain.
He thought that in Eastern Europe there was a confrontation between Germany and the Soviet Union, which Britain had to divert attention from. But he said the “ultimate goal” of the policy should be the “destruction of Nazism.” The cynics thought it was quite opportunistic. One of Chamberlain`s friends concluded that Halifax possessed “aalic qualities” and a capacity for “sublime betrayal.” Yet it was a climate in which several cabinet ministers were considering the resignation and bankers such as Churchill and another future prime minister, Harold Macmillan, were preparing to push for a new government when “Chamberlain reintroduced rats.” We are invited to vote in favour of this proposal which has been put forward in the document and it is certainly a very undisputed proposal, as is the amendment that has been postponed by the opposition. For my part, I am not in a position to agree with the measures taken and, since the Chancellor of the Exchequer has put his side so forcefully, I will try to approach the matter from a different angle, if I may. I have always believed that peacekeeping depends on the accumulation of deterrents against the aggressor, with a sincere effort to remedy the situation. Mr. Hitler`s victory was, like so many famous fights that determined the fate of the world, the closest. The Munich quotation in foreign policy debates is also common in the 21st century.
 During negotiations on the Iran nuclear deal by Secretary of State John Kerry, a Republican representative from Texas called the negotiations “worse than Munich.” In a speech in France, Kerry himself referred to Munich for military action in Syria: “This is our munich moment.”  The American historian William L. Shirer estimated in his “Rise and Fall of the Third Reich” (1960) that Czechoslovakia, although Hitler was not bluffing about its intention to invade, could have resisted considerably. Shirer believed that Britain and France had sufficient air defence to avoid severe bombing of London and Paris, and could have waged a swift and fruitful war against Germany.  He quotes Churchill as saying that the agreement means that “Britain and France are in a much worse position